Relations with China

Relations with China

From the outset, India adopted a friendly stance towards China. The Congress had long been sympathetic to China’s struggle against imperialism, even sending a medical mission to the country in the 1930s and calling for a boycott of Japanese goods in protest against Japan’s occupation of China. India was the first nation to recognize the newly established People’s Republic of China on January 1, 1950.

Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned a ‘resurgent Asia,’ based on strong friendship between India and China. He believed that, united by their shared history of suffering under colonial powers and common challenges like poverty and underdevelopment, both nations could work together to elevate Asia’s position on the global stage.

Nehru also supported China’s representation in the United Nations Security Council. In 1954, when Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed the Panchsheel Treaty, India recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet, accepting Chinese control over the region.

However, tensions began to rise in 1959 after a major revolt in Tibet led to the Dalai Lama fleeing the region, bringing with him thousands of refugees. India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama but refrained from allowing him to establish a government-in-exile or engage in political activities. This moves displeased China, and by October 1959, the Chinese forces fired on an Indian patrol near Kongka Pass in Ladakh, killing five Indian policemen and capturing a dozen others.

1962 War

The relationship took a sharp turn in 1962, when Chinese forces attacked Thagla Ridge, dislodging Indian troops and setting off a series of events that escalated into a full-scale conflict. In October, China launched a major offensive, capturing Indian posts in the eastern sector of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), and overwhelming the region.

In the western sector, Chinese forces seized 13 posts in the Galwan Valley and threatened the Chushul airstrip. Despite India’s attempts to seek assistance from the U.S. and Britain, the Chinese declared a unilateral withdrawal. Still, the war left deep scars, and relations between the two nations remained frosty for years.

Impact of the 1962 War

India had to divert resources meant for economic development and the Third Five-Year Plan to defense, creating a significant economic strain.

In August 1963, Nehru faced a no-confidence motion in the Lok Sabha, reflecting the domestic fallout from the war.

The defeat brought national humiliation, severely damaging India’s image both at home and abroad.

Nehru faced heavy criticism for his misjudgement of China’s intentions and India’s lack of military preparedness.

India’s foreign relations were deeply influenced by the “China factor,” with India’s approach to other nations becoming more cautious.

Relations between India and China remained cold until 1976, when diplomatic normalization began. In 1979, the

first top-level visit to China was made by then Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee.

India’s Nuclear Policy Doctrine

Nehru always had a firm belief in the power of science and technology to drive India’s rapid modernization. A crucial part of his industrialization strategy was the nuclear program, which began in the late 1940s, with the guidance of Homi J. Bhabha.

In August 1948, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission was established under the Department of Scientific Research, which had been set up a few months earlier in June 1948. Later, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was formally created on August 3, 1954, directly overseen by the Prime Minister through a Presidential Order. In line with a government resolution from March 1, 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was moved into the Department of Atomic Energy.

India’s nuclear ambitions were focused on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Although Nehru was opposed to nuclear weapons, advocating instead for global nuclear disarmament, he pragmatically supported the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In 1974, under Indira Gandhi’s leadership, India conducted its first nuclear test, which it termed a “peaceful explosion.” India maintained that it was committed to using nuclear power only for peaceful applications. This test occurred during a period of domestic economic challenges, including the oil shock of 1973, which caused inflation and economic turmoil in India.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council—U.S., USSR, France, U.K., and China—who had already developed nuclear weapons, sought to impose the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. India rejected the NPT, seeing it as discriminatory, as it applied only to non-nuclear nations and reinforced the nuclear monopoly of the five major powers.

In 1998, India again conducted nuclear tests, asserting its ability to use nuclear technology for military purposes. Pakistan followed suit soon after with its own nuclear tests. In response, the international community-imposed sanctions on both countries, which were later lifted when India pledged to adhere to a policy of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and reiterated its commitment to global nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy use.

In 2003, India officially adopted a Nuclear Doctrine based on the No First Use policy. Key features of this doctrine include

Nuclear weapons are maintained solely for credible minimum deterrence against nuclear attacks.

The NFU policy means India would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack.

India would not initiate a nuclear attack against non- nuclear states but retains the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a major chemical or biological attack.

In the event of a nuclear strike on India, the retaliatory second strike would be devastating and cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor.